Abid v. Abid, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 94 (Dec. 7, 2017) (en banc) by Gilbert, Carmen
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
12-7-2017
Abid v. Abid, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 94 (Dec. 7, 2017)
(en banc)
Carmen Gilbert
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Family Law Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gilbert, Carmen, "Abid v. Abid, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 94 (Dec. 7, 2017) (en banc)" (2017). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. 1108.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/1108
1 
 
Abid v. Abid, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 94 (Dec. 7, 2017) (en banc)1 
 
EVIDENCE: CHILD CUSTODY 
 
Summary 
 
The Court held that the district court properly exercised its discretion in allowing 
illegally recorded conversations to be used by a court appointed child psychologist to evaluate 
a child’s welfare in a custody case. 
 
Background 
 
Sean and Lyudmyla Abid divorced in 2010 and subsequently shared joint legal and 
joint physical custody of their child. In 2015, Sean moved to get primary physical custody. On 
at least two occasions, Sean recorded conversations between the child and Lyudmila without 
their knowledge or consent, likely in violation of NRS 200.650. Sean moved to admit the 
recordings into evidence, which the court denied. However, the court did provide those 
recording to Dr. Holland, a psychologist, to aid in evaluating the child’s welfare. Based in part 
on the recordings, Dr. Holland testified that Lyudmyla’s behavior was “creating confusion, 
distress, and divided loyalty.” Based on this and other evidence, the district court determined 
it was in the child’s best interest that Sean be awarded primary physical custody. Lyudmyla 
appealed the decision. 
 
Discussion 
 
Lyudmyla argued that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Holland 
to consider evidence obtained in violation of NRS 200.650.2 The court disagreed. 
 
An expert witness in a child custody proceeding may consider evidence obtained in violation 
of NRS 200.650 
 
 NRS 50.285(2) allows experts to consider inadmissible evidence only if the evidence 
is “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts.”3 Lyudmyla argued that psychologists do not 
normally rely upon illegally produced recordings. The Court reviewed the district court’s 
decision to provide the recordings to the psychologist and to deny Sean’s motion to admit under 
an abuse of discretion standard. However, the Court reviewed the district court’s legal 
conclusions regarding admissibility de novo.4  
 The Court held that the recordings, which contain Lyudmyla’s unfiltered interactions 
with her child, are the type of evidence that a psychologist would use to evaluate a child’s 
welfare. Further, while Nevada law allows a criminal defendant to move to suppress illegal 
                                               
1  By Carmen Gilbert. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.650 (2017). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.285(2) (2017). 
4  Davis v. Beling, 128 Nev. 301, 311, 278 P.3d 501,508 (2012). 
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recordings5, no analogous law exists in the civil context. The Court refused to read a broad 
suppression rule into NRS 200.650, and thereby conflate criminality with inadmissibility. To 
do so would be particularly unreasonable in the context of a child custody case wherein the, 
“[c]hild’s best interest is paramount.”6 
 Further, this case is distinguishable from Lane v. Allstate Insurance Co., where the 
plaintiff illegally recorded phone conversations to support tort and contract claims. There, the 
Court sanctioned Lane by prohibiting the recording’s use “in any fashion.”7 This sanction did 
not create a bright line rule, and the Court only held that suppression was appropriate in that 
particular case.8 This case is distinguishable from Lane because a child custody proceeding is 
more than a “mere adversary proceeding between plaintiff and defendant.”9 Here, the deterrent 
effect of barring Sean’s evidence in court was outweighed by the State’s “overwhelming 
interest in promoting and protecting the best interests of its children.”10 Moreover, there are 
many other methods to deter parents from taking actions like Sean’s; they could be prosecuted 
for the criminal activity, sued for intrusion of privacy, or sanctioned in other ways by the court.  
  
There is no per se rule that evidence obtained illegally is inadmissible in a child custody 
proceeding 
 
 Lyudmyla’s argument that illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible in a child custody 
proceeding is unfounded as there is no per se rule of inadmissibility in this context, and the 
Court refused to adopt one. Unless a statute expressly prohibits the admission of relevant 
evidence, it is presumed to be admissible.11 This presumption is derived from the common law, 
and while Mapp v. Ohio changed the rule to exclude evidence illegally acquired by the 
government in criminal cases, it did not affect the treatment of evidence illegally acquired by 
a private individual in a civil case.12 Categorically excluding illegally obtained evidence in a 
child custody proceeding would undermine the court’s duty to act in the best interests of minor 
children.13  
 Here, the recordings’ illegality did not render them inadmissible, and the court had 
broad discretion to rule on their admissibility.14 Where the court excluded recordings based on 
a belief that the law required exclusion, that ruling was erroneous, but harmless because it did 
not affect the court’s decision to award Sean primary custody. 
 
 
The district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in awarding Sean primary custody 
 
                                               
5  NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.505(1) (2017). 
6  Bluestein v. Bluestein, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 14, 345 P.3d 1044, 1048 (2015).  
7  Lane v. Allstate Insurance Co., 114 Nev. 1176, 1177, 969 P.2d 938, 939 (1998).  
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9  Munson v. Munson, 166 P.2d 268, 271 (Cal. 1946).  
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11  NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.025(1) (2017). 
12  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
13  NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.0045(2) (2017). 
14  Sheehan & Sheehan v. Nelson Malley & Co., 121 Nev. 481, 492, 117 P.3d 219, 226 (2005). 
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Lyudmyla also argued that the district court (1) abused its discretion by misinterpreting 
and relying on Dr. Holland’s opinion, and (2) unjustly ordered the change in custody to punish 
Lyudmyla in violation of Sims v. Sims.15 Based on the record, the Court found these claims to 
be without merit. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 A court’s duty to determine the best interest of a non-litigant child outweighs the policy 
interest in deterring illegal conduct between parent litigants. Accordingly, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in providing illegally obtained recordings for use in the psychologist’s 
evaluation, and this evaluation aided in the district court’s final determination. The Court 
affirmed the district court’s judgment. 
 
 
                                               
15  Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1149, 865 P.2d 328, 330 (1993). 
